In accordance with section 1(1) (b) of the Act our response is
provided below;
Question 1
We have now considered your request for information in question
1 and we are not obliged to supply the information requested.
Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 requires
Cheshire Constabulary, when refusing to provide such information
(because the information is exempt) to provide you with a notice
which a) states that fact, b) specifies the exemption in question
and c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the
exemption applies.
Reasons for the decision
This information is exempt by virtue of the following
sections:
Section 31 (1) (a) (b) (c) Law Enforcement
Section 38 (1) Healthy & Safety
Section 40 (2) Personal data
Section 44 (1) Prohibitions on disclosure
Although only statistical information is being requested, it is
low level data the disclosure of which could lead to the
identification of an individual, undermine an individual's right to
a private life, compromise law enforcement and jeopardise the
safety of an individual.
Therefore the above sections are engaged:
Section 40(2) Personal Information; Section 31(1)(a)(b)(c) Law
Enforcement; and Section 38(1) Health and Safety.
If any information is held the disclosure of which would breach
another enactment, e.g. the Children and Young Persons Act 1933
which places restrictions on the naming of children involved in
certain court proceedings, then Section 44(1) Prohibitions on
Disclosure is also engaged.
In respect of section 40(2) This is an absolute exemption where
disclosure would breach the principles of the Data Protection Act
1998, and in respect of section 44 this also is an absolute
exemption in circumstances described above.
In so far as section 31 and section 38 are concerned both are
qualified requiring evidence of harm/prejudice and the application
of a public interest test. For ease of reading I have appended the
harm and public interest test to the end of this response.
In order to assist you we can point to the MAPPA reports which
will provide statistics relating to the number of RSOs in the
Northern BCU, of which Warrington is a part.
For English and Welsh forces, MAPPA reports dating back to 2001
are available at the following links:
Probation
Home Office
Home
Office Probation
Question 2
The MAPPA guidance issued under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
states the following:
"...this guidance suggests that high/very high risk of serious
harm Category 1 offenders are visited by Police monthly, medium
risk quarterly and low risk at least annually, but preferably every
six months."
See the following link:
Probation Home Office Mappa
Cheshire Force Policy stipulates that we make the following
visits:-
Very high - Monthly
High - 3 monthly
Medium - between 6-9mnths
Low - Annually
Question 3
We cannot provide stats for Warrington alone, only for the
Northern area ie: Halton and Warrington. I have took the stats from
15-04-08 - 15-04-09
Purpose of Home Visits
Depending on the circumstances of the case, the purpose of a home
visit may be to:
- Check compliance with legislation and court orders (e.g. to
ensure notification requirements, bail or licence conditions are
being complied with);
- Confirm that the offender resides or frequents the address or
place notified;
- Fulfil the duty of care to the public to manage the risk posed
by the offender;
- Monitor the risk of the particular offender, identify changes
in risk factors and ensure appropriate action is taken to manage,
and where necessary, review the risk;
- Gather information for risk identification or review,
assessment and management of the particular offender and other
linked offenders, and for intelligence management processes;
- Detect offences;
- Fulfil the duty of care to the offender including referral to
other agencies for the provision of welfare, mentoring and
support.
6.4.7 Conducting Home Visits
Generally offenders should not receive prior warning of home
visits. Visits should take place during office hours and at
evenings and weekends.
6.4.9 Unsuccessful Home Visits
Unsuccessful home visits are those in which access to the
offender and/or the home is denied or not possible.
Following such a visit, a plan should be made by the visiting
officer(s) to conduct a home visit as soon as possible. All
unsuccessful home visits should be recorded for the purposes of
defensible decision making.
It can be seen therefore that 'negative visits' are highly
likely and are to be encouraged in order to effectively manage an
individual. There are also likely to be cases where it will be
necessary to make an 'arrangement' to visit an offender in order to
achieve effective management.
The point has also been made by some forces, and is worthy of
emphasis, that of the RSO's owned by a particular force, at any
time a number will be in Custody and therefore not subject of
visits. This along with the fact that some offenders will move
residence from one force area to another means that it is not
possible to compare the numbers of visits directly to the numbers
of offenders."
Required home visits
| Very High |
12 |
| High |
4 |
| Medium |
2 |
| Low |
1 |
| Unassessed |
1 |
Registerable Sexual Offender
| Required |
Actual |
% Actual |
Positive |
% Positive |
Negative |
% Negative |
Unknown
|
| Northern Division |
691 |
719 |
194.05% |
531 |
76.85% |
159 |
23.01% |
29
|
I now return to the harm and public interest test in relation to
question 1.
I have described below some of the history of actual harm that
has occurred following publication of details of RSO's and although
you have not asked for more specific details such as names etc.
never the less I think you are able to appreciate where the
disclosure by public authorities of ill thought out responses can
lead to.
Harm in Disclosure
The disclosure, publication, and subsequent discussion of
information relating to registered sexual offenders is invariably,
and understandably, emotive due to the actual and perceived nature
of these crimes. On occasion, however, this strength of feeling has
escalated to such a degree that both Registered Sexual Offenders
(RSOs) and innocent persons have been targeted by those in our
society who feel it is appropriate to take vigilante style action.
For example, in January 2007 there were attacks on a home for
persons with learning disabilities in Havant, when misinformation
and rumour became so entrenched that some local people decided,
quite wrongly, that the individuals must be paedophiles.
Similarly, in 2004, crowds converged on a family home in the
mistaken belief that Maxine Carr was being housed there. The rumour
had spread from a discussion in an internet chat room. Information
officially released into the public domain, whether through FOI
responses, police media statements, court reporting or MAPPA
reports, becomes accessible and available for wide circulation in
this way, and can then be combined with local knowledge,
supposition and rumour, with a view to identifying offenders.
Although the present request only asks for statistical
information, it is confined to a relatively small geographical
area. When similar personal information relating to RSOs has been
published on previous occasions, a clear relationship between the
publication of the information and subsequent public order
incidents can be demonstrated. This is evidenced by the
well-documented riots in Paulsgrove, Hampshire, in 2000, and the
attacks on Robert Oliver's home in Bishops Lydeard, Somerset, in
2006.
Both incidents followed the publication of details which
identified named individuals in national newspapers, and the
subsequent attacks indicate that persons are placed at risk of
physical and mental harm by such disclosures.
The requested information in the present case relates to
registered the numbers of sexual offenders whose whereabouts are
known, and it is accepted that the circumstances of these
individuals are different to those noted above.
Therefore, to demonstrate specific harm in relation to these
individuals, it must be shown that harm is still likely to occur
when the individuals in question are in an known and in a
documented location. This harm is likely to occur because the
requested information is not only personal information relating to
specific individuals, but is also information that is sufficient
enough in detail for others to attempt to make identifications
based upon all, or part, of it. Examples drawn from instances when
similar information has been disclosed on previous occasions
indicate that it is highly likely that some individuals sharing the
same name as a missing RSO, or who bear a resemblance to a
published photograph, will be misidentified and subsequently
subject to intimidation and physical harm.
There have been a number of instances where unconnected and
innocent individuals have been incorrectly identified as Registered
Sexual Offenders who have been named in national newspapers. In
April 2003, a national newspaper accidentally published the picture
of an unrelated individual alongside the name of a registered
sexual offender. In July and August 2000, a number of individuals
were the victims of vigilante attacks following the publication of
the names and photographs of convicted sexual offenders in a
national newspaper. One individual, and his family, were targeted
because he was seen wearing a neck brace similar to one worn by one
of the offenders in the published photo. He was misidentified
despite the fact that the photograph had not been taken recently,
and the offender himself no longer wore a neck brace. Other
individuals were identified and targeted because their names were
the same as those of the published offenders. In those cases the
details published by the newspaper were correct, but the published
information was then misinterpreted by those who read the
newspaper. In each case, leaflets were distributed stating that the
individuals were paedophiles.
In each case, police protection had to be assigned to the
individuals, and it was necessary for the police to distribute
their own leaflets to inform the public that the rumours and
accusations were not true. In these instances, the distress and
actual or potential physical harm caused by the incorrect
publication and the misidentifications discussed above, was
acknowledged by the newspapers themselves, as they subsequently
paid damages to the individuals concerned.
The ease of communication afforded by the internet means that
published information and the genuine concerns of the public are
open to manipulation and exploitation by determined organisations.
This occurs on several extreme right-wing websites, which have
raised concerns following their publication of the personal details
of specified individuals who have subsequently been subjected to
violent attacks. Several of these sites feature visual images
depicting public hanging scenes, accompanied by inflammatory
language relating to paedophiles; one accompanies this imagery by
asking readers to contact them with information about local
convicted paedophiles.
This evidences the fact that an active intelligence gathering
capability exists, where disclosed information can be used to form
a bigger picture by those intent on causing harm.
A further consideration is the impact that disclosure would have
on those offenders who are currently in compliance with their
notification, and are therefore being managed by MAPPA partners.
There is evidence that previous disclosures in national newspapers
affected even those sexual offenders who were not named in the
newspaper. In August 2000, a crowd gathered outside the house of,
and threatened, an individual accused of sexual offences in
Manchester, although he himself was not one of the offenders whose
details had been published. The likely outcome of any disclosures
that contribute to the genuine or misplaced identification of
offenders is that damage will be caused to the relationship between
MAPPA monitored offenders and those that are entrusted with their
monitoring. There is a legal requirement for this supervision to
take place, and the system must effectively risk assess and monitor
offenders, and thus prevent them from re-offending. The breakdown
of the relationship between sexual offenders and the relevant
supervisors creates an environment where the loss of knowledge
about offenders can lead to a situation where sexual crimes are
committed in spite of proactive, preventative policing.
The harm identified above has been evaluated and evidenced after
consideration of points raised in a Decision Notice previously
issued by the Information Commissioner (FS50069091).
In this notice, the IC accepted that:
- Some individuals may seek to act illegally upon information
which tells them....who is an RSO.
- Irresponsible media coverage can agitate strong feelings within
a community and potentially drive an RSO "underground" or even
overseas.
- There is a likelihood of attacks on individuals where their
names and addresses and/or photographs are published.
- Prevalent unsubstantiated rumour or misunderstanding may lead
to attacks on individuals who are not RSOs.
A recent Scottish IC Decision (177/2007) also discussed the
possibility of registered sexual offenders being subject to attack
or driven underground: "In my view such fears becoming a reality
turns on the likelihood of identification - if an individual cannot
be identified then they will not be at risk of attack or feel the
need to go to ground." As the requested information in this case
will identify individuals who are registered sexual offenders, on
this basis it is considered likely that the above effects will
occur.
Despite this, any consideration of harm in the disclosure of the
requested information must also consider the fact that similar
information has already published on the CEOP Most Wanted website.
To date, the publication of offenders' details on this site has
been a success, with nine missing offenders apprehended (of 14
published), and thus far, no occurrences of the vigilante action
discussed above. CEOP attribute this success to the consistent
application of a thorough process that underpins and supports the
controlled disclosure of offenders' details on this website. This
process can be summarised as follows:
- Only high risk sexual offenders who have breached their
notification requirements in respect of sexual offences relating to
children are considered for publication. (The majority of missing
sexual offenders do not fit into this category.)
- Prior to publication, a thorough and robust risk assessment is
conducted, which must take account of the rights and obligations of
all parties. Most importantly, the obligations of the police to
prevent crime and protect vulnerable children must be balanced
against the rights of the suspect and their families.
- The website gives clear guidance on what to do, and what not to
do, if a member of the public identifies an offender.
- Once an individual has been identified, a process is in place
for CEOP, police forces and MAPPA groups to engage to ensure that
the offender is dealt with appropriately.
In contrast to the process above, a response to an FOI request
is an unmanaged disclosure, where the public authority relinquishes
control of the dissemination of the information. In such a
circumstance, the process outlined above cannot be applied. In
addition, recipients of the information would be unaware of any
underlying investigation that may be taking place, and disclosure
could therefore compromise such operations as without the controls
noted above, it is highly likely that the publication of such
information would simply alert the offender, and cause them to move
on. The examples cited in this section have evidenced that errors
can and do occur when information is disclosed without appropriate
management.
Public Interest Test.
Accountability
This factor is relevant when the information disclosed relates
directly to the efficiency and effectiveness of the force or its
officers. The purpose of the Act is to make public authorities more
accountable, and the public interest will favour disclosure, for
example, when the information demonstrates how the force fulfils
their role or function. Disclosure of this information demonstrates
police awareness of offenders who are missing, providing
reassurance to the public that the police have the ability and
resources in place to ensure the proper police management of sexual
offenders on the register. The length of time that these offenders
have been missing will be relevant to judging the efficiency and
effectiveness of the force.
Human Rights, Morals and Ethics
The public interest may be served by providing information
because in the particular circumstances, it is simply the right
thing to do. This can be because of obligations placed on an
authority under the European Convention on Human Rights, or because
it is fair and reasonable to do so. In this instance, it can be
argued that the public have a right to know the identities of
missing sexual offenders, so that they can be informed about any
risks and can then take steps to increase their own personal safety
as appropriate.
Public awareness and debate
The public interest will favour disclosure when the information
can assist individuals by raising awareness of issues which may be
of relevance to them. Accurate public debate which corrects rumour,
speculation and falsehoods could remove the need to take
unnecessary actions, reduce the fear of crime and improve the
quality of life. This information will enable the public to be
better informed with regard to the activities of those offenders.
This will contribute to the quality and accuracy of public debate
in relation to the management of offenders, which is rife with
speculation and rumour fuelled by inaccurate media reporting and
gossip. This information would inform debate on the issues
concerning the management of sexual offenders, and allow evaluation
of MAPPA processes. Similarly, it will inform debate on any
perceived failings of the system.
Public Participation
This factor favours disclosure in instances where the police
service would benefit from public participation and the input of
the community at large. In this instance, disclosure of the names
and photographs of those registered sexual offenders whose
whereabouts are unknown will allow the public to assist the police
by giving them information that they can use to identify, and
potentially locate, those offenders who are in breach of their
registration requirements.
In addition to encouraging the public to report information
specifically concerning missing offenders, such a disclosure raises
the profile of underlying issues of sexual and child abuse, and
will encourage reporting of actual incidents of abuse, many of
which go unreported at present.
Public safety
There may be occasions when it is appropriate to disclose
information that would have an impact on public safety. This may be
applied where the public would benefit from having enhanced
knowledge and would therefore be able to take the necessary
precautionary steps to protect themselves. This factor is
particularly important due to public concerns raised by the murder,
in 2006, of Angelika Kluk by Peter Tobin, a convicted sexual
offender who was wanted by the police for failing to notify them of
a change of address, but who had evaded detection for almost a
year. In this case, disclosure of the information will place the
public in a position to be able to identify and report individuals.
It has been admitted on previous occasions that offenders without
supervision can lead to an increased risk of re-offending, which
could itself lead to an increase in crimes against members of the
public. As the disclosure of this information could lead to action
that would assist in locating an offender, it is logical to assume
that as the number of missing offenders decreases, public safety
will increase. It could also be said that disclosure of this
information would act as a deterrent to those offenders who would
consider breaching their registration requirements, encouraging
them to stay within a system of supervision where the risk of
re-offending is decreased.
Use of public funds
Where public funds are being spent, there is a public interest
in accountability. While the requested information does not relate
directly to finances or costings, it will allow analysis of
performance regarding the management of individuals in relation to
MAPPA funding.
Considerations Favouring Non-Disclosure
Efficient and effective conduct of the service/ a force
The public interest will favour non-disclosure when the current
or future law enforcement role of the force may be compromised by
the release of information.
In some cases, an offender may be unaware that his disappearance
has been detected, and an investigation may already be underway.
Disclosures which enable an offender to know whether or not their
disappearance has been detected will enable them to take steps
making it more difficult to detect their whereabouts. This may mean
that additional resources have to be diverted in order to locate
them. These resources are not finite and this will cause a
reduction of capability in other areas of public protection.
Similarly, the negative impact on those offenders who are managed
within the MAPPA system could drive offenders underground, reducing
the effectiveness of the system.
Any public order disturbances increase the strain on existing
police resources, as additional officers are required to be
redeployed to cope with the situation. This occurred in the
Paulsgrove incident previously mentioned, where 70 officers were
required to maintain order at the scene. This impacts upon
operational policing elsewhere, as it would be necessary to
withdraw officers from other areas. Several instances have been
cited where individuals unconnected to any offence, have required
police protection, or where the police were required to take action
to counter the false allegations made. This again leads to a
diversion of policing activity and places an additional burden on
force resources.
Existing procedures
It would not be in the public interest for Freedom of
Information to be used to obtain information which can more
effectively obtained under existing procedures, especially if to do
so would undermine those procedures. The current MAPPA protocol
stipulates that all agencies, when managing a level 3 offender,
must consider whether the circumstances of the case deems it
necessary to release details of the offender's identity, offending
behaviour, etc., to an individual or the general public. Amendments
to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, in which dealing with
sexual offenders will be incorporated, are due to be ratified in
2008. Those amendments will strengthen the current protocol used
when managing level 3 offenders.
Information relating to high risk missing offenders is already
disclosed through the CEOP website. This website focuses on those
offenders who pose the highest risk to the public, and all UK
police forces are now able to place details of their highest risk
offenders on the site. It is this method of controlled disclosure
that should be pursued, for the reasons outlined previously.
Flow of information to the service
While it has been acknowledged that the flow of information from
the public could increase as a result of disclosure, this must be
balanced against any possible breakdown of the relationship between
offenders managed within the MAPPA system, and their supervisors.
As previously outlined, this will lead to less effective risk
assessment of offenders, and could lead to an increase in
re-offending.
Human Rights, morals and ethics
The public interest will not be served if disclosure breaches
the obligations placed on an authority under the European
Convention on Human Rights, particularly the right to life, fair
trial and privacy. This principle applies to a wide range of
individuals, from the offender themselves, to their families, the
victims, and those non offenders, who suffer intimidation or
assault because of misidentification as a result of these
disclosures.
Interests of third parties
The public interest will favour non-disclosure when individuals
or third party interests might be jeopardised by release of
information that relates to personal affairs of individuals. This
can include reputations. Data Protection issues must also be
considered. The interests of innocent persons, non-offenders, and
the families and victims of offenders may be jeopardised by
disclosure, as outlined in the harm. The interests of offenders
will be jeopardised by the release of this information as it
relates to their personal affairs. It could cause a breakdown in
the supervision process and the support services available to an
offender if they no longer use them due to a lack of
confidence.
Investigations
It is rare that details of an investigation will be disclosed as
to do so will invariably release personal information, law
enforcement techniques and in the case of uncompleted cases
potentially damage the criminal justice process. The impact of
disclosure on ongoing investigations has already been discussed,
and attention has been drawn to factors that may compromise such
investigations.
Public safety
There may be occasions where the release of information relating
to public safety may not be in the public interest. Public Safety
is of paramount importance to the police service and its partner
agencies. The potential harm in offenders not being managed
properly and committing more crimes or innocent people being
targeted after misidentification is of grave concern and, whilst
wishing to embrace the ethos of information disclosure, this cannot
take precedence over public safety.
Balance Test
These two qualified exemptions require a balance test to be
conducted with regard to the public interest issues.
The factors favouring disclosure mainly relate to keeping the
public informed and police accountability. This is already achieved
to a very high level by the publication of the annual MAPPA report,
appropriate media releases and key performance indicators. This is
enhanced by the monitoring functions of Her Majesty's Inspectorate
of Constabulary. There is also a well established legislative
process, via the Police Reform Act, whereby the Independent Police
Complaints Commission will ensure any complaints about the police
service are dealt with appropriately. These facts somewhat reduce
the impact of any potential community benefit in receiving this
information.
It is accepted that it is in the interest of protecting public
safety that the public should be made aware of how many sexual
offenders are currently wanted because their whereabouts are
unknown, and furthermore, that police forces should be able to
provide this information. However, this aspect of accountability is
fulfilled by the disclosure of the statistics for the number of
missing offenders, rather than by more detailed information about
them. Furthermore, controlled disclosure of certain additional
information already occurs through the existing channel of the CEOP
website. This allows a narrow focus of attention, and the efficient
concentration of resources on a small number of particular
high-risk individuals. It is specifically due to the controls and
risk assessments in place to support these targeted disclosures,
that the CEOP website is proving such a success.
Opposed to factors favouring disclosure is the key negative of
public safety. We can never be entirely sure what effect
information disclosure may have. The impact of an uncontrolled mass
disclosure of a quantity of information can only be estimated on
the basis of previous occasions when large numbers of individuals
have been identified through media, rather than official channels.
Those instances have been accompanied by widespread public order
disturbances, and the targeting of individuals including those
completely unrelated to the offences in question. As far as the
police service is concerned, the protection of the community must
and will always take precedence over information provision. We
would be failing in our duty to protect all members of the public,
regardless of who they are, should one person suffer as a result of
a disclosure under this legislation.
At this time the balance is firmly tilted towards non
disclosure.