Project Griffin

Details on any advice or training given by your force to private security guards or private security companies in relation to how they might combat terrorism. More specifically:

1. How many of your officers have attended briefings on Project Griffin
2. Copies of any written advice your force has sent to companies on how security guards might assist the police in combating terrorism.
3. Details on any training sessions run by your force for private security guards on how to assist the police in combating terrorism. I would like copies on how many training days have been held over the last three years, the agenda for each session and the attendance list for each session.
4. In particular I am interested in any work your force has done to train or advise security guards on how to deal with suspected reconnaissance of targets in your force area. I would like copies of any written advice you have given on this matter and on training sessions you might have run with agendas and attendance lists.

In accordance with section 1(1) (b) of the Act our response is provided below;

Please Note: Project Griffin has been undertaken only within the last two months within Cheshire Constabulary with one course run to date.

Question 1

To date four Cheshire police personnel (PCSOs) have attended a Project Griffin event.

Question 2

Please find attached a copy of the 'flyer' that is sent out to companies promoting the event
Project Griffin Flyer

Question 3

To date Cheshire Constabulary have delivered one Project Griffin event . The event lasts approximately 2 to 3 hours. I have attached a copy of the slides detailing the agenda/objectives, (there is no set agenda as such).

Griffin objectives

• Threat levels
• Cheshire Counter Terrorism Branch
• International terrorism
  - Usama Bin Laden
  - The structure of AQ
  - Method of attack
  - Terrorist profile
• Irish related terrorism
• Domestic extremism
• The future for the UK
• Questions

Question 4

Attached are copies of the Project Griffin Power Point slides relevant to hostile reconnaissance.
Hostile Recce Slides

Please see my comments regarding further aspects of hostile reconnaissance contained within the presentation/programme.

In relation to that part of your request for attendance list details (question 3) I have now considered your request and I am not obliged to provide the information.

Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 requires the Cheshire Constabulary, when refusing to provide such information (because the information is exempt) to provide you with a notice which a) states that fact, b) specifies the exemption in question and c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

The information is exempt by virtue of

Section 40 (2) personal data

Section 40(2) Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information if

(a) it constitutes personal data which does not fall within subsection (1), and

(b) either the first or the second condition below is satisfied

(3) The first condition is:-

(a) in a case where the information falls within any of paragraphs (a) to (d) of the definition of "data" in section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act would contravene:-

(i) any of the data protection principles,

In this case disclosure would breach principles one and two of the Data Protection Act 1998 and would be unlawful. The exemption is therefore absolute.

In relation to that part of your request regarding hostile reconnaissance contained within the training material (question 4). This information, with the exception to that which is disclosed herein, is exempt by virtue of:

Section 31 (1) (a) (b) Law Enforcement

Section 38 (1) (b) Health & Safety

Sections 31 and 38 are qualified prejudiced-based exemptions and there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in disclosing this information as well as carrying out a public interest test, both of which are outlined below.

Evidence of overall harm

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat has remained at the second highest level, ‘severe’, except for two short periods during August 2006 and June and July 2007, when it was raised to the highest threat, ‘critical’, and in July 2009, when it was reduced to ‘substantial’. Nevertheless, the UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists.

The disclosure of the requested information would be detrimental to our ability and the ability of those charged with security to be able to deal with the on-going terrorist threat we face. By providing the information that we use to demonstrate, advise and issue guidance on detecting hostile reconnaissance we would in effect be providing those who would seek to do harm with the information on how to avoid detection.

Information relating to specific forces would enable terrorists to make judgments concerning their preferred travel routes and targets where they perceive there to be a greater vulnerability, lower staff levels and lesser probability of detection thereby increase the advantage to the terrorist and increase the risk and vulnerability to the security of the UK from terrorist attack.

The factors favouring disclosure for S31

By disclosing the information the public would see where public funds are being spent and would be able to take steps to protect themselves and their families.

Better public awareness may reduce crime or lead to more information from the public as they would be more observant in reporting suspicious activity.

Factors favouring non-disclosure for S31

By disclosing the information law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of terrorist crime. More crime would be committed because the terrorists would know which forces and which organisations had less CT capability and capacity and individuals would therefore be placed at higher risk. A fear of crime would be realised because if the terrorists identified ‘softer’ targets, they would target and exploit these areas and the public would be in fear of more terrorist activity occurring.

Factors favouring disclosure for S38

The public are entitled to know what areas of criminal activity the police service allocate public funds to therefore by disclosing this information, would lead to better informed public awareness and debate. Disclosure of the information would assist communities to be more aware of the level of protection afforded to them.

Factors favouring non-disclosure for S38

By disclosing the information the risks to individuals would be significant and there would be a loss of confidence in the police service to protect the well-being of the community.

Balance test

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by a terrorist attack, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly sensitive area of terrorism.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. CT measures are high-profile sensitive issues and are of intelligence value to the terrorist and therefore it is our opinion that in all the circumstances of the case the public interest in maintaining the exemptions outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.